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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
Similarly, Martin Marietta wanted to prevent production of the data un-
derlying the documents, as defense counsel in Nobles attempted to withhold
the investigator's written report.
The Supreme Court in Nobles made clear that the salient feature of the
implied waiver is counsel's attempt to use the work-product material in
testimony. The Fourth Circuit determined that Martin Marietta's disclosure
of the documents to the DOD constituted testimonial use. The court relied
on three factors in reaching its determination. First, the Martin Marietta
court held that Martin Marietta's interests and the DOD's interests were
sufficiently adverse. Second, the Fourth Circuit noted that Martin Marietta
expressly assured the government of complete disclosure of the documents.
Finally, the court found that Martin Marietta disclosed the documents to
the government to induce a settlement. The Fourth Circuit held that Martin
Marietta's disclosure of documents to the government was a testimonial
action and, consequently, that Martin Marietta had impliedly waived any
work-product privilege as to work-product material contained in the dis-
closed documents.
The Martin Marietta court last addressed the issue of the extent of the
implied waiver of Martin Marietta's work-product privilege. After noting
that the Fourth Circuit previously had placed documents into opinion work-
product and nonopinion work-product categories, the court determined that
the implied waiver should not apply to the former classification of docu-
ments. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that courts traditionally have protected
opinion work product, which includes an attorney's pure mental impressions
and legal theories. The court also indicated that an attorney's legal theory
has little relevance in determining the facts of a case, the primary purpose
of discovery.
The Fourth Circuit, therefore, upheld the district court's ruling on the
documents that Martin Marietta claimed to be under attorney-client privilege
and vacated the district court's decision as to the documents that Martin
Marietta classified as work product. Upon remand, the Fourth Circuit
ordered the district court to hold an in camera hearing at which Martin
Marietta will have the burden of distinguishing between the opinion work-
product documents and the nonopinion work-product documents. According
to the Fourth Circuit, if Martin Marietta can convince the district court of
the existence of opinion work product, the district court must protect those
documents from disclosure.
EVIDENCE
In Fiberglass Insulators, Inc. v. Dupuy, 856 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1988),
the Fourth Circuit considered whether statements that attorneys make in
the course of settling prior related litigation between parties are admissible
under FEDERAL RUI.E OF EVIDENCE 408 as statements made in the course of
settlement negotiations.
Fiberglass Insulators, Inc., a company that Krauss owned, sued Dupuy
in an antitrust suit, alleging that Dupuy attempted to eliminate Fiberglass
as a competitor in the insulation business by such activities as predatory
pricing. Krauss and Dupuy had been involved in five or six lawsuits since
1990]
